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of maritime law, placing private litigants at a disadvantage. 54 If, on appeal,6 5
the Supreme Court reaffirms the inviolacy of maritime uniformity and refuses
to establish a "balancing of interests" test to justify state encroachment,
the public must seek rectification of inadequacies in the federal scheme for
regulating oil spills. Recognizing that oil pollution liability should not be
regulated in terms of technical fault but in terms of who can better bear
the burden of the harm, two avenues of remedial action exist. The federal
courts could shift this aspect of maritime case law toward strict liability
either by declaring oil pollution an aboslute nuisance 56 or by deeming the
shipment of oil an ultrahazardous activity.57 If judicial interpretations of
maritime law prove too inflexible to accept such a determination, then
Congress must abolish legislative limitations on liability, substitute strict
enforcement for voluntary compliance, and provide relief for private property damage. The shipping industry can cope with the economic burdens
of strict liability by passing any added costs on to the public58 The cost of
oil can be absorbed, the damage it produces cannot.
W.

CHRISTIAN HOYER

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE RIVERS AND HARBORS ACT OF 1899
-A NEW REMEDY FOR ILLEGAL DREDGE AND FILL OPERATIONS
United States v. Moretti, 331 F. Supp. 151 (S.D. Fla .1971)
Defendants commenced dredge and fill operations in the navigable
waters of Florida Bay in Key Largo without acquiring the requisite permit'
from the Army Corps of Engineers. Upon being advised their actions were
unlawful, defendants ceased operations and applied for a permit.2 The
Corps of Engineers then requested comments from concerned parties and
solicited opinions from the Department of the Interior, the Environmental
Protection Agency, and various state agencies on the application.3 Although
54. Avins, supra note 47, at 366.
55. Probable jurisdiction in the instant case has been noted by the United States
Supreme Court for an appeal during the October 1972 term. Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 92 S. Ct. 1501 (1972).
56. W. PROSSER, TORTS §88, at 583 (4th ed. 1971); Avins, supra note 47, at 363.
57. See generally RrSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §165 (1965); W. PROSsER, supra note
56, §78, at 505.
58. International air carriers presently operate under a system of absolute liability.
Mendelsohn, supra note 53, at 18.
1. Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §403 (1970), provides in
part: "[I]t shall not be lawful to excavate or fill .. .any navigable water of the United
States, unless the work has been recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by
the Secretary of the Army prior to beginning the same."
2. 331 F. Supp. 151 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
3. Id.
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the project presented no impediment to navigation, opponents stressed the
potential damage to the bay's ecological balance. While the application was
still under consideration, defendants resumed operations. Work proceeded at
4
a furious pace despite numerous objections from federal and state officials.
On motion by the United States for injunctive relief, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida HELD, defendants had
unlawfully conducted dredge and fill operations. Defendants were ordered
to restore the bay to its original condition and were enjoined from selling
the land until the fill was removed. 5
Previously, the authority of the United States in the navigable waters
of the several states was "limited to control . . . for the purposes of navigation.''6 Accordingly, the Secretary of the Army was empowered to deny a
dredge and fill permit only upon determination that the project would have
a materially adverse effect on navigation.7 Navigability was accepted as the
determining factor, since it was the only condition expressly stated in the
enabling legislation.8 The authority for the Secretary's actions was the
Rivers and Harbors Act, 9 which prohibited "[t]he creation of any obstruction . . . to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United
States."' 1 This provision has been given a broad interpretation", and applies
4. Federal officials objected to the violation of statutes of the United States, particularly
33 U.S.C. §403 (1970). See note I supra. Objection was also made that defendants' action
had prevented timely studies of the area pursuant to the Fish and Wildlife Coordination
Act of 1958, 16 U.S.C. §662 (a) (1970), and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
42 U.S.C. §4332 (1970). State statutes were also violated by the unauthorized operations, particularly FLA. STAT. §253.123 (Supp. 1970), which provides in part, "No . . . corporation shall construct islands or add to or extend existing lands . . . bordering on . . . the
navigable waters of the state . . . without first complying .... ." with permit requirements. Primary concern, however, was over the damage to the bay's ecosystem caused by
removing bay bottom and destroying mangrove stands. United States v. Moretti, 331 F.
Supp. 151 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
5. 331 F. Supp. 151 (S.D. Fla. 1971). This decision has been appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and was argued during the week of Feb. 14-18,
1972.
6. Port of Seattle v. Oregon & W. R. R., 255 U.S. 56, 63 (1921).
7. Miami Beach Jockey Club, Inc. v. Dern, 86 F.2d 135, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1936); 34 0i,.
ATr'y GEN. 410, 412, 415-16 (1925).
8. See text accompanying notes 9-13 infra.
9. 33 U.S.C. §§401-26(i) (1970).
10. 33 U.S.C. §403 (1970).
11. In Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1 (1888), the Supreme Court
held there was no federal common law prohibiting an obstruction to a navigable stream.
In response, Congress enacted the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 426, which was
replaced by the Act of 1899, 30 Stat. 1121, whose provisions are found in 33 U.S.C.
§§401-26(i) (1970). The 1899 Act contained a compilation of existing laws on navigation,
32 CONo. REC. 2923 (1898), but "no essential changes." Id. Not long after the 1899 Act became effective the Supreme Court, in United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U.S.
690 (1899), gave the concept of "obstruction," as used in §10 of the 1899 Act (now 33
U.S.C. §403 (1970)), a broad sweep: "It is not a prohibition of any obstruction to the
navigation, but any obstruction to the navigable capacity, and anything . . . however
done . . . which tends to destroy the navigable capacity of one of the navigable waters
of the United States." 174 U.S. at 708.
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not only to structures but also to excavating and filling operations. 12 The
prohibition, however, is qualified by an express exception for projects
receiving the Secretary's approval. 1 Although the Act itself places no restrictions on the Secretary's discretion
to grant or deny permits, most cases arising under the Act have dealt only
with navigation problems. 1 4 In Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v.
Volpe,15 however, a federal district court held that the Corps of Engineers
exceeded its authority by recommending approval of a fill permit after
considering only navigational factors." In the landmark case of Zabel v.
Tabb" the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the Secretary's
refusal, solely on environmental grounds, to grant a fill permit. The Zabel
court relied upon recent environmental legislation 8 in reaching its decision. Particular emphasis was given to the Fish and Wildlife Coordination
Act,'0 which requires any private or public agency seeking a federal permit2o
to alter a navigable body of water to first consult the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service.21 The purpose of this consultation is to prevent
damage to wildlife resources in connection with water resource development. 22 This requirement was supplemented by the National Environmental
Policy Act,2 3 which requires federal agencies to consider ecological factors
when dealing with projects affecting the environment. 24 Construing these
acts in pari materia the Zabel court concluded that the Secretary could
refuse to grant a permit under the Rivers and Harbors Act solely for con25
servation reasons.

12. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 485 (1960).
13. 33 U.S.C. §403 (1970), which provides: "[U]nless the work has been recommended
by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army prior to beginning
the same."
14. See, e.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967); United
States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S.
367 (1929); Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925).
15. 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970).
16. Citizens Committee concerned an expressway project that included a dredge and
fill operation. In addition to the fill permit the approval of the Secretary of Transportation
was required before an accompanying causeway could be constructed. But if the fill project
were complete, the Secretary of Transportation, considering the enormous amount of work
and expense involved, would have no choice but to approve the causeway. Thus, the Corps
of Engineers had usurped the jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation by, in
effect, granting approval for the causeway. 302 F. Supp. at 1089-90.
17. 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970).
18. Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1958, 16 U.S.C. §§661-66 (1970); National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§4321-47 (1970).
19. 16 U.S.C. §§661-66 (1970).
20. The court in Zabel presumed that land holders would become a private agency
under a federal permit once the Corps of Engineers' permit was issued 430 F.2d at 209
n.19.
21. 16 U.S.C. §662 (a) (1970).
22. Id.

23. 42 U.S.C. §§4321-47 (1970).
24. 42 U.S.C. §4332 (c) (1970).
25. 430 F.2d at 214.
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The instant case not only presents an important extension of the concept
asserted in Zabel but also marks the first instance in which a developer has
been compelled to restore shorelands to their natural state in recompense
for illegal dredge and fill activities..2 6 Authority for this new remedy is
section 12 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, 27 which provides, in addition to
criminal penalties, that "the removal of any structures . . . erected in
violation of [this Act] may be enforced by the injunction of any district
court exercising jurisdiction in any district in which such structures may
exist .....
28 The meaning of "structures" in this provision has been the
subject of much litigation.2 9 In Sanitary District v. United States- the Government brought suit to enjoin diversions of water that had reduced the
level of Lake Michigan to a degree that impeded navigation. The defendant
argued that injunctive relief was restricted to removal of "structures."'' The
United States Supreme Court, however, responded that the United States Attorney General, by virtue of his office, could seek appropriate relief without
specific statutory authorization. 2 The only requirement for maintaining suit
33
was that the United States have an interest to protect.
In United States v Republic Steel Corp.34 the Court again rejected an
argument that would have limited injunctive relief to the removal of structures. There, industrial solids emitted by Republic's iron mills had substantially reduced the depth of an adjacent channel. In holding these
emissions to be an obstruction within the meaning of the Act,3 5 the Court
stated that the prohibition against obstructions was broad enough to include
any diminution of the navigable capacity of a waterway.38 Furthermore, the
Court declared that appropriate remedies must be fashioned, even though
based on inferences, so that the "great design" 37 of the Act would not be
frustrated.38
Imposition of injunctive relief as the appropriate remedy in the instant
case constitutes an important step toward greater protection for the environ26.

Telephone interview with Kenneth G. Oertel. Ass't United States Attorney for

the Southern District of Florida, Feb. 1. 1972.
27. 33 U.S.C. §406 (1970).
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967); United
States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960); Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266
U.S. 405 (1925); United States v. Bigan, 274 F.2d 729 (3d Cir. 1960).
30. 266 U.S. 405 (1925).
31. Id. at 408.
32. Id. at 426.
33. Id.
34. 362 U.S. 482 (1960).
35. Id. at 485.
36, Id.
37. The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 was enacted to fill a void created by the
Supreme Court's decision in Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch. See note 11 supra. The
1899 Act was considered to be a codification of earlier federal statutes and has been held
to be a "broad expression of policy in unmistakable terms." Sanitary Dist. v. United States,
266 U.S. 405, 429 (1925).
38. 362 U.S. at 492.
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ment, particularly for shorelands. In most cases of indiscriminate development the meager criminal penalties provided by the Act 9 are simply inadequate to insure the effectiveness of the statutory protections. 40 Where the
sanctions of criminal liability are inadequate to protect an interest of the
United States, civil actions have been deemed proper. 41 In Wyandotte Transportation Co. v United States42 the Supreme Court held that the Government
was entitled to sue to recover expenses incurred in removing a negligently
sunken vessel. Relying on the Rivers and Harbors Act the Court stated:
"We do not believe that Congress intended to withhold from the Govern43
ment a remedy that insures the full effectiveness of the Act."
The remedy of damages was initially explored in United States v. Perma
Paving Co. 44 where the Government sought to recover costs incurred in
dredging shoal from a navigable channel. The shoal resulted from the misuse of riparian property owned by the City of New York. The city conceded
that under Republic Steel 45 the district court could have issued an injunction directing the city to remove the shoal and could have held it in contempt for disobedience. 46 However, the city argued that the United States
could not perform the work itself and then collect the cost from the city.4 7
The court rejected the city's argument and found no reason for reading the
Act so narrowly. The court further observed that damages appeared less
burdensome than requiring a task the defendant might have neither the
knowledge nor the skill to perform. 48 A more important aspect of the
remedy was that it would assure the federal government the speedy and
competent removal of an obstruction to navigation. 49 The court found no
basis for reasoning that the imposition of criminal penalties and injunctive
relief indicated a congressional desire to withhold damages, when in many
instances it would be more appropriate. 50 No issue regarding the propriety
of the government's action was raised in Wyandotte,51 but the Supreme
Court nevertheless characterized it as a classic case in which rapid action
by someone was essential.52

39. 33 U.S.C. §406 (1970) provides in part: "Every person and every corporation that
shall violate any of the provisions of [this Act] . . . shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $2,500 nor
less than $500, or by imprisonment (in the case of a natural person) not exceeding one
year, or by both ....
"
40. 331 F. Supp. at 151.
41. E.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 204 (1967).
42. 389 US. 191 (1967).
43. Id. at 204.
44. 332 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1964).
45. See text accompanying notes 34-39 supra.
46. 332 F.2d at 757.

47. Id.
48. Id. at 758.
49. Id.
50. Id.

51. See text accompanying notes 42-44 supra.
52. 389 U.S. at 204.
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Although rapid remedial action was not obtained in the instant case, 53
recognition of the inadequacy of statutory protection and realization that
shorelands are an essential element to a healthy marine ecosystem made
restoration of the bay a necessity.54 In a detailed presentation of the ecological
background of the area the court indicated that prior to defendants'
operations Florida Bay was a feeding and nesting sanctuary for many species
of shore and wading birds. 55 Additionally, the bay was very productive as a
nursery for numerous game and commercial species of fish.56 The shoreline
was filled with living mangrove plants, which contributed to the energy
flow of the area as a food source. 57 The court was highly cognizant of the
interdependent relationship between growing plant communities and the
various forms of animal life. The broad effects of defendants' activities
were therefore assessed as both harmful to commercial and sport fishing and
58
as injurious to the natural beauty and enjoyment of the area.
Although environmental damage was the primary issue, the court contrasted the reasonable behavior of the Corps of Engineers with the flagrantly
unlawful actions of the Moretti Company.59 It appears the defendants'
intentional disregard of the requirements of the Rivers and Harbors Act
may have been a factor in the court's decision to order restoration of the bay.
6
However, the Act's prohibition of unauthorized dredge and fill activities 0
is not conditional upon the bad faith of the offender. Under the Act,
restoration is equally appropriate to unintentional obstructions as well as
to deliberate violations similar to those in the instant case. 61
It may be argued that restoration will not accomplish its purpose
because it is impossible to restore the bay to its natural state. The court
in the present case, however, partially met this objection by ordering defendants to present adequate plans for the safe removal of fill material so as
not to interfere with marine or plant life by causing excessive siltation or
turbidity.62 Furthermore, the court stated that once the fill material is
removed, Florida Bay would eventually restore itself and increase its marine
6
productivity to the former level. 3

53. Defendants resumed their illegal activities in late May 1971 and proceeded with
dredging and filling, despite numerous objections from state and federal officials. See text
accompanying notes 3-4 supra. The defendant, Joseph G. Moretti, Jr., was arrested on
July 14, 1971, but despite the arrest the Moretti Company continued operations. Finally, a
preliminary injunction was entered on July 30, 1971. However, by the time for further
hearings on the injunction, practically all of the originally

planned dredging had been

completed. 331 F. Supp. at 155.
54. 331 F. Supp. at 157-58.
55. Id. at 156.
56.

Id.

57. Id.
58. Id. at 157.
59.

Id.

60. See 33 U.S.C. §403 (1970).
61. Id.
62. 31 F. Supp. at 151.
63. 331 F. Supp. at 157.
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